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Cost-sharing is regarded as an important tool to reduce moral hazard in health insurance. Contrary
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1 Introduction
Moral hazard, speciﬁcally ex-post moral hazard, is argued to be one of the main impediments to
a well-functioning insurance market. Once insured, individuals no longer pay the full price of the
health care that they consume. This increases health care expenditures. Economists have pointed
out that this is caused by insurees who overconsume health care as they no longer face its entire
cost. Accordingly, the consumption of additional health care by the insured is characterized as
welfare-decreasing as it must be valued below cost, for otherwise it would also be consumed in the
absence of insurance. In response, economists have proposed partial insurance as a means to deter
the consumption of ineﬃcient care.2 The view that regards moral hazard as entirely ineﬃcient
has been challenged, however. Nyman (1999a) points out that a major part of the additional
care is consumed only by the insured because it is only aﬀordable with insurance, not because it
has little value. If insurance provides access to otherwise unaﬀordable care, the additional health
expenditures of the insured are neither ineﬃcient nor a threat to the well-functioning of an insur-
ance market. On the contrary, the additional expenditures by the insured must then be viewed as
the very reason for the existence of this market.3 Reducing these additional expenditures through
partial insurance is then neither necessary nor desirable.4
Empirical evidence is robust in showing an eﬀectiveness of partial insurance in reducing uti-
lization (Zweifel and Manning 2000). Contrary to the prediction of ineﬃcient moral hazard,
however, the reduction in health spending is not restricted to care that is considered little ef-
fective. Instead, insurees react to increased cost by reducing both valuable and less valuable
care (Zweifel and Manning 2000; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015). While this ﬁnding remains robust,
its interpretation is controversial. Some scholars criticize a welfare analysis based on consumer
demand as consumers may lack information to distinguish high-value from low-value care (Rice
1992).5 Pauly and Blavin (2008) suggest to diﬀerentiate cost-sharing arrangements according to
2For nice overviews of the literature on moral hazard in health insurance, see Zweifel and Manning (2000) and
McGuire (2011).
3Nyman (1999b) calls this beneﬁt of insurance its access value.
4In fact, Fels (2016) shows that deductibles can destroy more than the access value of insurance if aﬀordability
constraints matter. In addition, they excessively reduce the actuarial value of insurance by not only reducing the
payment given a claim, but also reducing the probability of ﬁling a claim. The latter is due to the fact that, in
many insurance markets, beneﬁt payment is conditional on deductible payment. That implies that an insuree is
unable to make use of his insurance if he cannot aﬀord to pay the deductible.
5Others defend the traditional welfare analysis, insisting that treatment eﬀectiveness is not to be confused with
treatment eﬃciency (Peele 1993). As a highly eﬀective care can also produce high non-monetary cost, the ﬁnding
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consumers' mistakes in appropriately assessing the quality of care. This idea is essentially reﬂected
in the concept of value-based insurance design as proposed by Fendrick et al. (2001) (see also
Fendrick and Chernew (2006)). Still, researchers remain worried that cost-sharing arrangements
are an instrument that discriminates only insuﬃciently between appropriate and inappropriate
care (Zweifel and Manning 2000).
In addition, consumer-directed health care, as insurance with strong elements of cost sharing
is called, has drawn criticism for reducing access to health care, irrespective of the quality of
that care. There is a growing concern that cost-sharing arrangements prevent the consumption
of necessary care, in particular among low-income households.6 This criticism is underscored by
evidence that suggests a negative association between insurance coverage and health outcomes for
those with low income and poor health (Zweifel and Manning (2000) pp. 442-444, Tamblyn et al.
(2001)). An eﬃcient allocation of resources in health care thus requires insurance plans both to
deter the consumption of ineﬀective care (ineﬃcient moral hazard) and to ensure access to eﬀective
care (eﬃcient moral hazard). While typical instruments of cost sharing such as deductibles and
co-payments seem eﬀective in achieving the ﬁrst, they seem to fail at the second requirement. The
reduction of access to eﬃcient care through cost sharing has - to my knowledge - so far either been
entirely ignored or considered as a necessary evil in the insurance literature. This is unfortunate
as access concerns are of high societal and political relevance7 and, as I will point out in this
paper, can be appropriately addressed through a diﬀerent, astonishingly simple insurance design
that involves bonuses instead of cost-sharing.8 The evil turns out to be unnecessary.
In this paper, I analyze diﬀerent insurance designs to address moral hazard. First, I provide
a simple model of insurance that includes both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient moral hazard. The ﬁrst is
a simple consequence of aﬀordability constraints and constitutes the access value of insurance as
proposed by Nyman (1999b). The second reﬂects the well-known idea that full insurance leads
of a reduction of eﬀective care does not necessarily contradict the notion that the additional health expenditure of
insured individuals is welfare-decreasing.
6See e.g. Beck (1974) for early evidence of a stronger response to cost-sharing among lower-income households.
In contrast, Chandra et al. (2014) ﬁnd a response of low-income households that is similar to higher-income groups
when measured by demand elasticities. Notably, however, they ﬁnd that roughly 70% of the spending reduction
of low-income households can be attributed to reductions on the extensive margin, i.e. a reduction of utilization
to zero. For a recent review of the literature on the relationship between out-of-pocket cost and utilization, see
Schokkaert et al. (2017).
7For recent media coverage, see Jan (2015) and Pear (2015).
8The possibility to use rebates to mitigate moral hazard is already recognized by Rubinstein and Yaari (1983).
Here, I point out that such contracts have the additional advantage of not creating access problems.
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consumers to seek care even if it is of low value. I show that in this framework, an insurance with
bonuses welfare-dominates both full insurance and partial insurance involving cost-sharing. In the
following section, I extend the model to allow for consumer mistakes in distinguishing low-value
from high-value care. I analyze which insurance design maximizes welfare in a framework that
incorporates both of the reasons that have been suggested to explain consumers' indiscriminate
response to cost-sharing: access problems and consumer mistakes. Finally, I point out that cost-
sharing leads to an additional ineﬃciency beyond reducing access. It introduces an adverse-
selection problem into the insurance market that puts selective pressure on exactly those types
that value insurance the most. Again, I show that an insurance, that relies on bonuses instead of
cost-sharing, does not produce such a problem of adverse selection. In the ﬁnal section, I conclude.
2 An Insurance Model with Two Types of Moral Hazard
Suppose a risk-neutral individual faces a probability pi ∈ (0, 1) of sickness. In case of sickness,
health care is available at cost p. The value of care is private information of the consumer at the
time of treatment choice. It can confer a high value Vh > p, such that treatment is eﬃcient. It
can be of low value Vl < p, such that it is eﬃcient to abstain from treatment. Ex ante, sickness is
associated with a high-value treatment with probability pih and with a low-value treatment with
probability pil, such that pih + pil = pi. The individual's budget x at the time of need is a random
variable from an ex-ante perspective. Let F (x) denote the cumulative distribution function over
x, and by xˆ =
∫
xdF (x) the expected wealth at the time of need. Assume a simple additively-
separable utility function u(c, k) = c+ k where c denotes utility from consumption and k denotes
utility from receiving care. W.l.o.g. I normalize k to zero both in the state when no care is needed
and in the state when care is needed but not received.
Then the utility from remaining uninsured is given by
u0 = (1− pih)xˆ+ pih [ρE [x|x < p] + (1− ρ)(Vh + E [x|x > p]− p)] (1)
= xˆ+ pih(1− ρ)(Vh − p), (2)
where ρ = F (p) denotes the probability of not being able to aﬀord the cost of care p. When
remaining uninsured and thus having to pay the full cost of care out of pocket, the consumer
decides to receive treatment only if it is of high-value. Yet, even if treatment has high value, the
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consumer may not be able to aﬀord treatment when his budget falls below p.
Consider an insurance that fully covers treatment cost and is available at a premium w. As the
price, that the consumer needs to pay to receive treatment, is reduced to zero, care is consumed
irrespective of value. Fully insuring then yields a utility
ufull = xˆ+ pihVh + pilVl − w. (3)
Full insurance leads to the consumption of care whenever sick, even if care is of low value. How-
ever, consumption of high-value care is no longer conﬁned to the case when care is aﬀordable.
Calculating the premium, that leaves the consumer indiﬀerent between full and no insurance,
yields the maximum willingness-to-pay for for full insurance:9
w¯full = pip+ pihρ(Vh − p)− pil(p− Vl). (4)
Subtracting the expected cost of full insurance cfull = pip, allows to derive the net surplus of full
insurance:
sfull = w¯full − cfull = pihρ(Vh − p)− pil(p− Vl). (5)
The net surplus of insurance consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part reﬂects the access value of insur-
ance as described by Nyman (1999b). Insurance is valuable (even to a risk-neutral individual) as
it helps to overcome aﬀordability constraints that prevent consumers from receiving eﬃcient care.
The second part reﬂects the familiar problem of full insurance leading to the consumption of inef-
ﬁcient care. It is important to point out that both parts embody a form of moral hazard, as both
relate to the consumption of additional care by the insured. The ﬁrst part constitutes eﬃcient
moral hazard as insurance allows consumers to consume eﬃcient care that is otherwise unaﬀord-
able, and the second part constitutes ineﬃcient moral hazard, as insurance makes consumers seek
care even if it is of low value. Importantly, ineﬃcient moral hazard, if large enough, can reduce
the surplus below zero, leaving no gains from trade in the market. Accordingly, economists have
proposed to impose cost-sharing as a means to deter the consumption of ineﬀective care, thereby
9Note that I abstract from aﬀordability constraints with respect to the premium w. This is a deliberate modeling
choice. The model is used to determine the maximum willingness-to-pay for insurance in order to determine the
net welfare implications of diﬀerent insurance designs. Aﬀordability constraints with respect to the premium mean
that actual demand no longer appropriately reﬂects the value that the consumer derives from insurance.
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eliminating ineﬃcient moral hazard.
Suppose that insurance no longer fully covers medical expenses but speciﬁes a deductible
d < p.10 That is, insurance no longer reduces the price of care for the insuree to zero, but to d. If
d is set suﬃciently high such that Vl = d < Vh, the insuree refrains from seeking care if it is of low
value, and seek care if it is of high value. Buying such partial coverage then results in a utility of
up = (1− pih)xˆ+ pi [δ(E [x|x < d]) + (1− δ)(Vh + E [x|x > d]− d)]− w (6)
= xˆ+ pi(1− δ)(Vh − d)− w, (7)
where δ = F (d). The willingness-to-pay for and the cost of insurance of partial insurance are then
given by
w¯p =pih [(1− δ)(p− d) + (ρ− δ)(Vh − p)] , (8)
cp =pih(1− δ)(p− d). (9)
This results in a surplus of
sp = wp − cp = pih(ρ− δ)(Vh − p). (10)
The nonnegativity of the surplus of partial insurance shows that deductibles are able to deter the
consumption of ineﬀective care as predicted. This comes at the cost of conﬁning the consumption
of eﬀective care to the state in which the deductible is aﬀordable. The model thus encompasses
limited access as a possible explanation for the indiscriminate reduction of utilization that is
observed. Essentially, deductibles are too eﬀective in reducing care utilization thereby trading
one ineﬃciency - ineﬃcient moral hazard - for another - the reduction of access to valuable care.
Importantly, if δ ≈ ρ, the entire surplus of insurance vanishes. If aﬀordability constraints are
suﬃciently severe such that it becomes equally unlikely for the consumer to aﬀord the deductible
as it is to aﬀord the complete cost of care, the entire reason for insurance purchase vanishes. If
access motives underlie insurance purchase, cost-sharing amounts to throwing out the baby with
the bathwater.
10Note that if medical expenses are lumpy, there is no need to distinguish between diﬀerent forms of cost-sharing.
d simply speciﬁes the total amount of money the insuree has to spend to seek care, irrespective of whether this is
the result of deductibles, co-payments, other fees, or a combination of them. For convenience, I will simply refer
to the total amount as deductible.
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Suppose that, instead of requiring a deductible payment in case of care consumption, insurance
fully covers treatment cost, but promises a bonus payment (or rebate) r in case that care is not
consumed. If this no-claim bonus is of appropriate size, Vl = r < Vh, the consumer prefers to
receive the bonus in case that care is of low value and prefers to seek treatment in case that
treatment is of high value. This results in the utility
ur = xˆ+ (1− pih)r + pihVh − w. (11)
Calculating willingness-to-pay, expected cost, and net surplus yields
w¯r =(1− pih)r + pih(p+ ρ(Vh − p)), (12)
cr =(1− ph)r + pihp, (13)
sr =pihρ(Vh − p). (14)
Similar to insurance with cost-sharing, rebate insurance limits consumption of care to high-value
care. However, in strong contrast to cost-sharing, rebates do not limit the access to high-value
care. They are thus able to successfully deter consumption of low-value care, while, at the same
time, not inhibiting reception of high-value care. In this way, rebate insurance is able to achieve
the ﬁrst-best outcome. This comes at higher insurance cost of cr = (1− ph)r + pihp, as insurance
beneﬁts are no longer conﬁned to only paying for treatments. The net welfare surplus of rebate
insurance, however, is strictly larger than the surplus of insurance with cost-sharing whenever
there is a positive chance that the deductible is unaﬀordable, δ > 0.
Proposition 1. If consumers are perfectly informed, rebate insurance is able to fully eliminate
ineﬃcient moral hazard while protecting access, thereby achieving the ﬁrst best.
The result contradicts the notion that access reduction is a necessary evil if we want to in-
centivize eﬃcient utilization of health care by consumers. There is indeed a way in which we can
achieve the same incentivization without reducing the consumption of eﬃcient care by putting
up access barriers. In addition, the larger surplus of rebate insurance can straightforwardly ex-
plain evidence that suggests a preference for rebates over deductibles as observed by Johnson,
Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993) (see also (Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow 2013),
pp. 118-119).11 It is, however, important to recognize that rebate insurance requires premium
11Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993) propose an explanation based on diﬀerent frames being
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payments that are substantially larger than insurance relying on cost-sharing. Hence, aﬀordabil-
ity constraints are likely relevant at the time of insurance purchase. I abstract from these in the
formal analysis as these can be appropriately addressed through subsidizing insurance purchase
without distorting utilization incentives.12
3 Consumer Mistakes
Consumer mistakes have been proposed as an explanation for the observed indiscriminate response
of consumers to cost-sharing arrangements (Rice 1992; Pauly and Blavin 2008). Consumers may
reduce both the consumption of eﬀective and ineﬀective care in response to cost-sharing if they
have problems distinguishing the two. In this section, I augment the model of the previous
section to allow for consumer mistakes. The augmentation then incorporates both explanations -
access reduction and consumer mistakes - in a simple model that allows to compare the welfare
implications of diﬀerent insurance regimes.
Suppose that consumers make mistakes in their assessment of whether a treatment is of high
or low value. Assume that a consumer wrongly assigns a high value to a low-value treatment with
probability α ∈ [0, 1], and wrongly assigns a low value to a high-value treatment with probability
β ∈ [0, 1]. I call the ﬁrst mistake a false positive and the second mistake a false negative (with
regard to the question as to whether treatment is eﬃcient). I assume throughout that α+ β ≤ 1.
In case of remaining uninsured, the consumer only seeks treatment if treatment is deemed
worth the cost p (correctly or incorrectly) and if treatment is aﬀordable x ≥ p. Then the utility
from remaining uninsured is given by
u0 = xˆ+ pih(1− ρ)(1− β)(Vh − p)− pil(1− ρ)α(p− Vl). (15)
In contrast, full insurance leads to treatment independent of its value:
ufull = xˆ+ pihVh + pilVl − w. (16)
applied to insurance rebates and deductibles. The only alternative explanation for such a preference, that I am
aware of, is Zweifel (1987). In that framework, rebates are desirable for breaking the time correlation, that is
associated with cost-sharing, between a ﬁnancial loss and a health loss.
12Note that this is not true for the aﬀordability constraints that apply to deductibles. Subsidizing deductible
payments undermines the incentives that are the reason for imposing cost-sharing in the ﬁrst place.
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Maximal willingness-to-pay and expected cost of insurance are then given by
w¯full =pih [Vh(1− (1− ρ)(1− β)) + p(1− ρ)(1− β)] + pil [Vl(1− (1− ρ)α) + p(1− ρ)α] , (17)
cfull =(pih + pil)p. (18)
Hence, full insurance creates a surplus of
sfull − cfull = pih [β + ρ(1− β)] (Vh − p)− pil [(1− α) + ρα] (p− Vl). (19)
As before, sfull is not necessarily positive. The ﬁrst, positive part reﬂects the consumption of
additional eﬃcient care due to full insurance. The second, negative part reﬂects the consumption
of additional ineﬃcient care due to full insurance. It is noteworthy that both mistakes have a
positive eﬀect on sfull. Consider the implication of a false negative (β): if the consumer wrongly
deems high-value care to be of low value, treatment is avoided without insurance. Under full
insurance, all care is consumed irrespective of the value that the consumer assigns to it. Thus,
the fully-insured consumer receives treatments that are incorrectly deemed of little value. In
this way, full insurance corrects the false-negative mistakes of consumers. Consider next the
implication of a false positive (α): if the consumer wrongly classiﬁes care as being of high value, it
is also consumed by the uninsured (as long as it is aﬀordable). That means that a certain part of
ineﬃcient care is consumed regardless of insurance status. If this is true, full insurance is no longer
responsible for all of the ineﬃcient care that the consumer demands. This reduces the severity of
ineﬃcient moral hazard. Pauly and Blavin (2008) have already pointed out these positive eﬀects
of consumer mistakes on the desirability of full insurance. Their analysis, however, misses the
dampening impact of aﬀordability constraints on this result. As ρ → 1, consumer mistakes have
no eﬀect on the desirability of full insurance anymore. This is intuitive: if access barriers fully
prohibit the consumption of care when uninsured, then the beliefs of the consumer do not matter
anymore. No care is consumed when uninsured irrespective of perceived value, while all care is
consumed by the fully insured irrespective of perceived value. In that case, consumer mistakes
neither aﬀect the desirability of remaining uninsured nor the desirability of full insurance, and,
hence, they cannot aﬀect the comparison of the two.
Consider again partial insurance with a deductible d that makes the consumption of low-value
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care unattractive: Vl = d < p. The utility from buying partial insurance is given by
up = xˆ+ pih(1− δ)(1− β)(Vh − d) + pil(1− δ)α(Vl − d). (20)
Maximal willingness-to-pay and expected cost of insurance are given by
w¯p =pih(1− β) [(1− δ)(p− d) + (ρ− δ)(Vh − p)] + pilα [(1− δ)(p− d) + (ρ− δ)(Vl − p)] , (21)
cp =(1− δ) [pih(1− β) + pilα] (p− d). (22)
Hence, cost-sharing through partial insurance creates a surplus of
sp = w¯p − cp = pih(1− β)(ρ− δ)(Vh − p)− pilα(ρ− δ)(p− Vl). (23)
In contrast to the case of the fully-informed decision-maker, this surplus is not necessarily posi-
tive. This is because partial insurance can only deter the consumption of ineﬃcient care if it is
correctly identiﬁed as such, i.e., if the consumer does not commit a false positive. In addition,
the incentivization of cost-sharing reduces the consumption of eﬃcient care for two reasons. First,
as in the case of the fully-informed consumer, eﬃcient care is not consumed if the deductible is
unaﬀordable. Second, eﬃcient care is no longer consumed even if aﬀordable. If it is wrongly con-
sidered as ineﬃcient, i.e., if the consumer commits a false negative, the cost-sharing requirement
deters the consumer from seeking high-value care.
Cost sharing has two advantages over full insurance. First, consumption of nonvaluable care
is restricted to the case of a false positive. Second, even if a false positive occurs, the individ-
ual may no longer consume nonvaluable care whenever the required deductible is unaﬀordable.
Hence, deductible insurance reduces detrimental moral hazard to the case in which both a false
positive occurs and the deductible is aﬀordable. These two advantages need to be weighed against
two disadvantages. First, consumption of valuable care is restricted to the states in which it is
correctly recognized as such. That is, insurance no longer corrects false negatives. In addition,
partial insurance conﬁnes the consumption of valuable care to the state in which the deductible
is aﬀordable and thereby reduces the access value.
Consider the case of rebate insurance if the rebate is set such that low-cost care is not con-
sumed: r = Vl. This yields a utility of
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ur = xˆ+ pih(1− β)Vh + pilαVl + (1− pih(1− β)− pilα)r − w, (24)
which can be used to determine the maximum willingness-to-pay. Again, we can calculate the
surplus of rebate insurance by subtracting the cost from the willingness-to-pay.
w¯r =pih(1− β) [ρVh + (1− ρ)p] + pilα [ρVl + (1− ρ)p] + (1− pih(1− β)− pilα)r (25)
cr =pih(1− β)p+ pilαp+ (1− pih(1− β)− pilα)r (26)
sr =pih(1− β)ρ(Vh − p)− pilαρ(p− Vl) (27)
Rebate insurance holds an advantage over partial insurance as aﬀordability constraints no longer
restrict the consumption of valuable care when correctly identiﬁed. On the other hand, these
aﬀordability constraints no longer prevent the consumption of low-value care due to a false positive.
If the latter eﬀect dominates the former eﬀect, rebate insurance is inferior to partial insurance.
Hence, when consumers make mistakes in assessing the quality of care, cost-sharing can be superior
to rebates. As is pointed out in the last section, that cannot be the case when consumers are fully
informed.
Given the collection of advantages and disadvantages that the diﬀerent regimes feature, it is
important to describe the regime that maximizes welfare (as measured by surplus) for a given
parameter constellation. For this matter, deﬁne
φ :=
pih(Vh − p)
pil(p− Vl) . (28)
φ measures the expected net eﬃciency of treatment. If φ ≥ 1, then the expected value of care is
worth its cost, or, put diﬀerently: an uninformed decision-maker would seek care if and only if
φ ≥ 1.
It turns out that the welfare comparison across insurance regimes is rather straightforward:
Proposition 2. If φ > 1−α
β
, then the largest welfare (surplus) is generated by full insurance.
If α
1−β ≤ φ ≤ 1−αβ , then the largest welfare (surplus) is generated by rebate insurance.
If φ < α
1−β , then welfare is maximized by no insurance.
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Proof. First, note that sr ≥ sp holds if and only if sp ≥ 0, with strict inequality for δ > 0.
Second, the comparison of sfull and sr yields
sr ≥ sfull ⇔ φ ≤ 1− α
β
(29)
while sr ≥ 0 if and only if φ ≥ α1−β .
Finally, α
1−β ≤ 1 ≤ 1−αβ holds since α + β ≤ 1 by assumption.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If φ is very large, the expected net beneﬁt of receiving
high-value care greatly outweighs the expected net cost of paying for low-value care. Hence, the
beneﬁt of correcting a false negative through full insurance outweighs the cost of also treating those
who (correctly) deem the treatment not worth the cost. This makes full insurance more desirable
than any insurance that relies on consumer incentivization, be it partial or rebate insurance. If
φ is very low, then the cost of providing access to people who commit a false positive outweighs
the beneﬁt of providing access to people who correctly deem treatment valuable. In this case, no
insurance is welfare-maximizing. In the intermediate cases, when φ ≈ 1, it is optimal to incentivize
the consumer through rebate insurance.
Figure 1: Optimal Insurance Design
Figure 1 illustrates these boundaries. It is only when 1−α
β
≤ φ ≤ α
1−β that it is welfare-
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maximizing to incentivize the consumer's care decisions through insurance design. Note that this
corridor spans the entire range as α+β → 0. As the consumer's decisions approach the decision
of a perfectly-informed decision-maker, rebate insurance is always optimal, as is shown in the
previous section. As α + β → 1, the range of φ, for which incentivization through rebates is
optimal, shrinks to zero, because both the upper and the lower boundary converge to 1. In the
extreme case, when α + β = 1, it is either better to fully insure or not to insure at all. This is
also intuitive. If α + β = 1, then the consumer's belief about the quality of care is completely
uninformative about the actual quality of care. In that case, it makes no sense to make use of the
consumer's knowledge. Instead welfare maximization follows the decision rule of an uninformed
decision-maker who prefers to seek care if and only if φ ≥ 1. Hence, if φ > 1, an uninformed
decision-maker prefers the consumer to always seek treatment. That is ensured by full insurance.
If φ < 1, the decision-maker prefers the consumer to always abstain from treatment, and the
treatment probability is minimized if the consumer remains uninsured.
Figure 1 also shows that if there are major aﬀordability barriers imposed by cost-sharing, δ ≈
ρ ≈ 1, full insurance dominates cost-sharing for almost all values 1 ≤ φ ≤ 1−α
β
. This is because,
as δ → 1, the utilization reduction in response to cost-sharing reveals more information about
the consumer's budget than about the consumer's belief about the quality of care. There exists a
cutoﬀ φ′ = 1−(1−δ)α
1−(1−δ)(1−β) , depicted by the dashed line, above which it is better to fully insure instead
of relying on the contaminated information revealed through cost-sharing. In the same way, if
δ ≈ ρ ≈ 1, the surplus generated by cost-sharing in the range α
1−β ≥ φ ≥ 1 vanishes. In conclusion,
aﬀordability constraints greatly diminish the informational value provided by cost-sharing. This
is not the case for rebate insurance, which is able to fully extract the informational advantage of
the consumer - provided there is one (α + β < 1).
Proposition 2 shows that cost-sharing is never the welfare-maximizing design as long as δ > 0,
despite the previous observation that there are cases in which it dominates rebate insurance.
However, these turn out to be equivalent to the cases in which no insurance is welfare-maximizing.
The intuition of this result is straightforward. In comparison to rebates, cost-sharing has the
advantage of restricting the consumption of ineﬃcient care if the consumer commits a false-positive
but does not have enough resources to pay for the deductible. This advantage has to be weighed
against the disadvantage of consumers not being able to receive (correctly-identiﬁed) eﬃcient care
when deductibles are unaﬀordable. If the advantage of cost-sharing is larger than the disadvantage,
cost-sharing is better than rebates in terms of welfare. However, if eliminating the (erroneous)
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consumption of ineﬃcient care under a false positive is worth restricting the consumption of
(correctly identiﬁed) eﬃcient care, then this is true regardless of a person's budget. Hence, it also
applies to the case in which the deductible is aﬀordable. Importantly, the same advantage and
disadvantage - restricted to the case when the deductible is aﬀordable - describes the comparison
of partial insurance to remaining uninsured. Thus, if (and only if) cost-sharing dominates rebates,
then no insurance dominates cost-sharing.
While section 2 shows that rebate insurance is maximizing welfare if the consumer is perfectly
informed, this section shows that this result still holds if the consumer is informed suﬃciently well.
As the consumer's information deteriorates, the extreme options of full or no insurance become
the designs that maximize welfare. Apart from boundary cases, δ = 0, cost-sharing is never the
optimal solution. This is because cost-sharing basically trades one ineﬃciency for another as it
reduces the consumption of eﬃcient care along with the intended reduction of ineﬃcient care. As it
turns out, the ineﬃciency of reduced access through cost-sharing breeds an additional ineﬃciency:
adverse selection.
4 Adverse Selection on Income
Adverse selection has typically been described with reference to heterogeneity in the health risk
pi. Here, I want to point out that cost-sharing produces an additional source of adverse selection.
Assume a perfectly-informed consumer and consider the expected cost of insurance under cost-
sharing
cp = pih(1− δ)(p− d). (30)
Beyond the health risk pih, the cost of insurance is also determined by the probability of an insuree
being able to pay the deductible (1− δ). If people diﬀer in their ability to pay, then there is cost
heterogeneity even after controlling for health risk. Simply put, the height of access barriers
imposed by cost-sharing may diﬀer across people depending on their ﬁnancial status. Formally,
suppose people are described by their type of budget risk θ ∈ {H,L}, with a high risk facing
a larger probability of not being able to aﬀord a payment of size x: FH(x) > FL(x), ∀x > 0.
Straightforwardly, this implies cp(H) = pih(1 − δH)(p − d) < pih(1 − δL)(p − d) = cp(L), where
δθ = Fθ(d). That means it is more costly to insure the more auent, i.e. those who face a
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lower budget risk. Note that, at the same time, the ﬁrst-best surplus from insurance is given by
sFB(θ) = pihρθ(Vh − p) with ρθ = Fθ(p). The auent, i.e., the type with the lower budget risk,
derives a lower net value from insuring.
Given that the poor are less costly to insure, they face selective pressure. Either the poor are
pooled with the rich and are, thereby, forced to cross-subsidize the more extensive utilization of the
auent while themselves facing a major probability of being unable to actually use their health
plan once in need. Or they can choose to leave the market foregoing any gains from insuring.
Cost-sharing thus creates a selective pressure against the very type that derives the largest value
from insurance.
The selective pressure on the poor is not present under rebate insurance for the simple reason
that they do not impose any access barriers on using a given plan. Hence, conditional on health
risk, both types have identical cost of insurance
cr(H) = (1− pih)r + pihp = cr(L). (31)
Consequently, there is no selective pressure created by pooling the two types, resulting in the
ﬁrst-best surplus for both types.
By creating access barriers, cost-sharing actually produces two novel ineﬃciencies in the at-
tempt to combat ineﬃcient moral hazard. First, it restricts the consumption of eﬃcient care by
imposing aﬀordability constraints on the consumption of said care. Second, as these constraints
diﬀer across income groups, they produce a source of adverse selection that puts selective pressure
on exactly the type that, conditional on health status, derives the largest value from insurance.
Scholars have already recognized that income diﬀerences can be a source of heterogeneity with
regard to insurance cost and/or value, and have analyzed the implications for market outcomes.
Wambach (2000) analyzes an insurance market in which types diﬀer with regard to their health
risk and their wealth. The latter determines insurance value - but not its cost - by assuming
decreasing risk aversion. Boone and Schottmüller (2015) show how income diﬀerences may explain
the phenomenon of advantageous selection if income is negatively correlated with health risk and
positively correlated with care utilization in case of sickness.13 Here, I argue that an alternative
13Boone and Schottmüller (2015) assume utilization to vary on the intensive margin with income, while access
problems are more in line with variation on the extensive margin. Still, Boone and Schottmüller (2015) is the only
work, that I am aware of, that recognizes the potential of cost-sharing to be a source of adverse selection.
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incentivization scheme based on boni can mitigate this source of heterogeneity.
It is noteworthy that rebates have so far been typically analyzed as a means to screen diﬀerent
risk types.14 This literature analyzes the usefulness of rebates as a tool for risk-adjustment in a
dynamic setting. The literature has thus already established the potential usefulness of such an
incentivization to address adverse selection.
5 Conclusion
Cost-sharing is observed to reduce care utilization, but the observed reduction does not seem to
distinguish suﬃciently with respect to the quality of care. In this paper, I use a simple model that
incorporates two potential reasons for this indiscriminate response: limited access and consumer
mistakes. The analysis reveals that cost-sharing is never a welfare-maximizing insurance design.
If consumers are suﬃciently well-informed about the quality of care, then it is desirable to extract
that information through appropriate incentivization. In this case, however, a positive incentiviza-
tion through bonus payments/rebates dominates a negative incentivization through cost-sharing,
as the former does not restrict consumption of eﬃcient care based on aﬀordability. It is shown
that, alongside deterring the consumption of ineﬃcient care, cost-sharing produces two new ineﬃ-
ciencies by restricting access to eﬃcient care and, thereby, producing an adverse selection problem
based on income. Rebate insurance yields the same incentivization without producing these inef-
ﬁciencies. If consumer mistakes are strong enough, the extremes of full or no insurance become
the welfare-maximizing regime, as there is little use in incentivizing an ill-informed consumer.
The paper shows that limitations of access are no necessary byproduct of incentivizing the
eﬃcient utilization of care. Depending on the relative importance of eﬃcient and ineﬃcient care,
cost-sharing may actually do more harm than good. In this paper, a simple, alternative design
invoking bonuses is proposed that is already in use in some insurance markets - although mostly for
the purpose of risk adjustment. Oﬀering positive incentives to consumers for not using ineﬃcient
care can yield the same incentives as negative incentives. At the same time, they allow consumers
to express their preferences, instead of just revealing their ﬁnancial capabilities. This points at a
more general lesson. If aﬀordability problems distort the appropriate reaction to incentives, then
it can be welfare-enhancing to use shadow prices in a positive incentive scheme instead of using
14See Dionne, Fombaron, and Doherty (2013) for a nice exposition.
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actual prices in a negative incentive scheme.
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